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Abstract: Maintenance-free wavelength-division-multiplexing quantum key 
distribution for 30 days was achieved through a 22-km field fiber. Using 
polarization-independent interferometers and stabilization techniques, we 
attained a quantum bit error rate as low as 1.70% and a key rate as high as 
229.8 kbps, making the record of total secure key of 595.6 Gbits 
accumulated over an uninterrupted operation period.  
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1. Introduction  
Contemporary cryptographic protocols are implemented by computer algorithms based on that 
certain mathematical problems are practically impossible to solve using current computer 
resources and well-known attacks. This kind of algorithmic cryptography is not provably 
secure, and vulnerable to off-line attacks that can occur long after a secret message has been 
sent. A well known scheme of provably secure protocol is Vernam's one-time pad (OTP), in 
which a truly random key whose length is the same as that of a plain text should be shared 
between the legitimate sender and receiver for encryption and decryption simply by exclusive 
OR with the plain text, and is used only once. Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide a 
means to share such a truly random key on demand through a physical channel of photon 
transmission. Its security can be proven against the eavesdropper with unbounded abilities. 
Although QKD technology has become in practical use, its speed and distance are still 
limited. Commercial products typically operate at key rates of about a few kbps over a few 
tens of km field fibers [1, 2]. Therefore they are often used not in the OTP mode but in hybrid 
mode combined with contemporary cryptographic protocols, such as refreshing the seed keys 
for symmetric key encryption scheme. As for QKD systems in laboratories, key rates reach a 
few hundred kbps over 40~50 km field fibers [3–5], which enable one to support real-time 
OTP encryption of video data. Recently wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) QKD 
system is developed [6-7], providing a flexible solution to support variety of applications 
including secure voice transmission and real-time secure TV conferencing with OTP 
encryption. In fact, increasing the key rate only with single-channel QKD has a bottleneck due 
to a speed limit of single-photon detectors, whose novel types operate in a GHz range [8-11], 
but further improvement is not easy.  
Now a current important task for putting such state-of-the-art QKD technologies to 
practical uses is quality assurance, especially for long-term maintenance-free operation. The 
high-speed QKD specifications mentioned above have been recorded only for two weeks at 
longest [12]. Their stability has not yet been at a sufficient level to be certified for practical 
services in commercial environments.  The stability also directly affects the certification of 
QKD security. Experimental guarantee of stable key generation with low enough quantum bit 
error rate (QBER) for a long period is a prerequisite for quality assurance of a QKD system.  
We report on maintenance-free, continuous key generation over 30 days using two 
quantum channels through a 22-km field fiber. Our WDM-QKD system has polarization-
independent interferometers and newly implemented stabilization control, which can optimize 
various parameters automatically. We achieved stable key generation of higher than 200 kbps 
in total and QBER of 1.61% and 1.86% for each channel on average for 30 days, and 
accumulated secure keys of 595.6 Gbits in total over uninterrupted duration. 
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2. WDM-QKD System 
In the previous works, we established a compact optical transmission block consisting of 
planar lightwave circuits (PLCs), which are superior in mass productivity, reliability, 
polarization-insensitivity, and controllability [13-15]. Figure 1 shows simplified functional 
diagram of the optical system. In a transmitter (Alice), a PLC-based 2×2 asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) converts an optical pulse from a laser diode (LD) driven at 
1.24 GHz into a pair of pulses with a time delay of 400 ps. An encoder puts data and basis 
information on the pair for preparing the time-bin signal in phase-time coding. Then variable 
optical attenuator (VOA) attenuates the power of the pair to 0.5 photons. The quantum signal 
is combined with the clock signal for precise and automatic synchronization by using a WDM 
coupler and is transmitted through the same fiber. In a receiver (Bob), a PLC-based 2×4 
AMZI, which is totally passive, followed by four photon detectors, decodes the time-bin 
signal. The delay tuning of the AMZIs is made with the temperature controller (TC) within an 
accuracy of 0.01 K to attain a total extinction ratio as high as 20 dB [13]. 
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of single-channel QKD. LD: laser diode, PLC: planar lightwave circuit, 
AMZI: asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer, TC: temperature controller, VOA: variable 
optical attenuator, CLK: optical clock source, WDM: wavelength-division multiplexing 
coupler, PD: photo diode, SPD: single photon detector. 
These technologies can be optimally used to implement our GHz-clocked WDM-QKD 
system, which can potentially handle up to eight wavelength channels allocated on the ITU-T 
100-GHz grid from 1545.3 to 1550.9 nm. One more important technology is required to make 
the WDM-QKD system cost-effective, which is a colorless interferometer consisting of the 
PLC AMZI whose temperature is controlled for polarization-independent interference and a 
technique of phase mismatch compensation for every wavelength. Figure 2 shows our WDM-
QKD system. In the transmitter, optical pulses emitted by LDs are multiplexed with a WDM 
coupler. The multiplexed pulses pass through the PLC AMZI, and are converted into the time-
bin signals. They are then demultiplexed, and each wavelength component is encoded with bit 
data and basis information by phase and amplitude modulation as denoted by A(n). 
Additional phase modulators denoted by (n) follow to compensate for the phase 
mismatches. The receiver decodes the signals almost in the reverse manner. Thanks to this 
colorless interferometer with the PLCs, we could have demonstrated WDM-QKD with 
reduced system size, cost and control complexity [6-7]. 
Optical components including colorless interferometer and other elements required by a 
QKD system such as synchronization and key distillation are mounted onto the advanced 
telecom computing architecture (ATCA) chassis and 19-inch rack. Our WDM-QKD system is 
designed for a secure key rate >1 Mbps over a 10-dB loss channel, when eight wavelength 
channels are fully operated.  
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Fig. 2. WDM-QKD system with the colorless interferometer. Synchronization is omitted. 
 
3. Stabilization Techniques 
Even if we set parameters to the optimal values at the beginning of operation, the key 
generation performance would degrade after a certain amount of time. This is caused by 
temperature change of the transmission fiber or location, the drift of power-supply voltage, 
and temporal change of devices. For long-term reliable operation, we have to suppress these 
effects. For example, polarization variation in transmission fiber is critical to the extinction 
ratio of the usual interferometer, and dramatically increases the QBER within a short time. 
The polarization variation could be solved by the polarization-independent interferometer 
based on the PLC technique [13] as mentioned above. For another example, fiber expansion 
delays the optimal detection timing of photon detectors. In our system, the delay of 50 ps 
causes degradation of photon count rate to around 80%. Therefore we optimize detection 
timing with an accuracy of 12.5 ps. To improve the reliability of the QKD system, such 
optimizations have to be done for various components constantly. We have newly added the 
following stabilization controls : 
- Detection timing of the photon detectors 
- Bias voltage of the encoding modulator 
- Temperature of the PLC interferometer 
- Amplitude of the phase compensation modulator  
The stabilization control software periodically retrieves the key generation performance 
(photon count rates and QBERs) from the receiver Bob (Fig. 2). Then it supervises the device 
components listed above to vary the operating point slightly different from the present ones 
and monitors the key generation performance again to see the results. Finally the software 
compares those results on tunings and chooses the optimal parameters to the best operating 
point. This control scheme keeps each parameter optimal and results in stable key generation 
performance even if the environmental condition and the component condition fluctuate. 
4. Long-term Field Demonstration 
We demonstrated our 2-channel WDM-QKD for BB84 protocol using wavelengths, 1 
(1547.72 nm) and 2 (1550.92 nm). The transmission channel is a 22-km field installed 
single-mode fiber in a loop-back configuration. More than 95% of the channel is in an aerial 
fiber over poles.  The total loss is 12.6 dB. In the receiver, two avalanche photodiode (APD) 
systems [11] were used. The quantum efficiency and dark count rate were 10–15% and 1-2 k 
count/s.  
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Fig. 3. Polarization stability measurement of 36 hours. The red and blue lines are orthogonal 
polarizations measured through a polarizing beam splitter. The green line shows the total 
transmitted power. The yellow crosses denote the sunshine duration for 10 minutes. 
Figure 3 shows a typical variation of fiber transmission characteristics in terms of 
polarization drift. Polarization fluctuates all the time. The fluctuation is more apparent during 
the day. 
Figures 4 (a) and (b) plot the QBERs, the sifted and secure key rates for the two channels 
for 30 days. The QKD performance of each channel is summarized in Table 1. During 30 days 
of continuous operation, stable secure key generation at an average rate of 229.8 kbps in total 
and the averaged QBER of 1.70% were achieved.  
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Fig. 4. Key generation performance of 1 (a) and 2 (b) over 30days. 
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Table 1. Key Generation Performance for 30 days 
Wavelength 
[nm] 
QBER 
[%] 
Sifted key rate 
 [kbps] 
Secure key rate 
[kbps] 
1: 1547.72 1.61 315.3 151.5 
2: 1550.92 1.86 168.0 78.3 
Total 1.70 483.3 229.8 
 
In Table 2, we compare some results of recent long-term field operations. The total 
number of secure bits distributed over the 22 km installed fiber for a 30-day uninterrupted 
duration of continuous operation amounts to 595.6 Gbits. This is an order of magnitude larger 
than those in the previous works, such as 70.3 Gbits over the 3.7 km installed fiber for  327 
days (SQ3 link from 3 Sep 2009 to 26 July 2010) by Stucki et al. [16], and 63.3 Gbits by 
Dynes et al. over the 45-km installed fiber for 60 hours [17].  
 
Table 2. Comparison of Recent Long-term Field Operations 
 This work Swiss Quantum [16] 
Toshiba-NICT 
[17] 
SEQURE (CV-
QKD) [18] 
Uninterrupted duration 
of continuous operation 30 days 327 days 60 hours 85 days 
Distance [km] 22 3.7 45 17.7 
Channel loss [dB] 12.6 2.5 14.5 5.6 
Secure key rate [kbps] 229.8 2.5 293 0.6 
Average QBER [%] 1.70 
1.2 
 (estimated from 
 Fig. 7 [16]) 
Not available Not used 
Total secure keys 
distributed [Gbits] 595.6 70 63.3 4.4 
Channel loss normalized 
secure keys 
 [Tbits/channel loss] 
10.8 0.12 1.78 0.016 
 
To capture the quality of long-term QKD operation, one may introduce a new figure of 
merit, namely the channel-loss normalized secure key, defined by an amount of distributed 
secure key in total divided by a channel loss. This metric shows the size of accumulated 
secure key over an uninterrupted period through an assumed lossless channel. One can 
estimate how large secure key can reliably be distributed over a given channel, by multiplying 
this metric by a real channel loss to be used. Our result is 10.8 Tbits, which is an order of 
magnitude larger than those ever reported to our knowledge. 
5. Conclusion  
We have developed a high-speed QKD system based on the scalable WDM technique with 
polarization-independent interferometers and stabilization control of various parameters. By 
driving the system with two channels, we achieved 30 days of maintenance-free continuous 
key generation with QBERs of 1.70% and a secure key rate of 229.8 kbps through a 22-km 
field fiber with 12.6-dB loss. We introduced a new metric, the channel-loss normalized secure 
key to quantify the quality of long-term QKD operation. Our result amounted to the world 
record of 10.8 Tbits. 
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